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The Ethical Foundation for the Pragmatic
Conception of Justice
Anton Donoso*
In this article Dr. Donoso brings together from Dewey's writings a

number of comments on the nature of justice. He concludes that for

Dewey justice is but one of many interrelated human virtues. It thus

shares the characteristicwhich Dewey ascribes to virtue generally, and
cannot be equated either with current standards of morality or with

other fixed and absolute rules.
Since the death of John Dewey ten years ago, his thought has been
the subject of a number of works, some of the most significant of
which deal with his philosophy of law and of justice. The question
of his conception of justice arises out of his general effort to show
that the resolution of moral conflicts between various claimants is
possible by the use of the scientific method, by which is meant inteligent examination justified by reliable public test through reference
to consequences. This entails the formulation of a norm of justice
that is both valid (true) and morally binding (obligatory).
Excluding the "positivistic" methodological materialists, who question the very possibility of ethical knowledge based on experimental
grounds, there is disagreement among the pragmatic ethical naturalists themselves as to what a norm of justice would entail. The observation has been made that this disagreement is due mainly to the
ambiguity of Dewey's argument. It is said that his position lends
itself to two divergent interpretations, both of which have lead to
types of reductionism, one of whose consequences is the impossibility
of applying instrumentalisticethics to a particularissue. To say the
least, this is most unfortunate in an area known as practical philosophy.1
One aspect in the overall solution to the acknowledged ambiguity
in Dewey's own treatment of "justice" is an examination of the context
* Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of Detroit.
1. Cf. Jaffe, The Pragmatic Conception of Justice, in 34 UNvEasrry OF CAixFoRNr
uT Pmsosopii 10 (1960). Professor Jaffe, author of the most extensive
contribution to the study of justice according to Dewey, has attempted to reconcile
the conflicting elements in the two previous attempts to establish a norm of justice
and presents what he calls the "interactionist" interpretation-a norm of justice both
true (i.e., scientific) and obligatory (i.e., morally binding). In his excellent essay he
presents the first results of his proposed two-part effort to formulate, in a more general
manner, the pragmatic conception of justice in order to determine eventually the
political program to which such a norm would commit those who accept it.
PuBLicATONS
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out of which emerged his initial concern with this "virtue." It will be
the attempt of this paper to present this context by correlating

Dewey's thought on the ethical foundation for the pragmatic conception of justice.2 The context is one of concern with the Right and
the Good. And, the resolution of the problem (the problem of the
impossibility of applying instrumentalistic ethics to a particular issue)
will be seen to have its ethical basis in Dewey's insistence that we can

not go from the idea of duty in general to some particular act as dutiful
unless we make a "connection" between Right (the best way of doing

something) and Good (the object that is to be attained).

First of all, what is meant by "ethical" foundation? To Dewey,

"ethics is the science that deals with conduct, in so far as this is

considered as right or wrong, good or bad."3 As such, ethics is not

merely the sum of other studies or sciences, for to it falls the task of

relating the two aspects or sides of conduct or moral life, the inner
process as determined and changed by outer conditions and the

outward behavior as determined by the inner purpose, or as affecting

the inner life.4 Ethics does not deal with all behavior, however. Its

concern is primarily with "conduct in which the individual thinks and
2. Dewey's first extensive treatment of morality was in his OUTINES OF A
CarrbcAL THEORY OF ETHICS (1891). In 1957 the book was reproduced by Hillary
House of New York. In 1903 he published his significant essay on the Logical Conditions of a Scientific Treatment of Morality, in 3 DECENNIAL PUBLICATIONS OF Tim.

UNivEasrrY OF CHAcACo 113-39 (1st series). In 1908 he published an essay on
'Ethics," later reprinted as Intelligence and Morals, in THE INFLUENCE OF DARwIN ON
PmrosoY AN OTnim ESSAYS 46-76 (1910). That same year in cooperation with
James H. Tufts he put out the work entitled Ethics. Part I and chapters XXII-XXVI
of Part III were by Tufts, while Part II and chapters XX and XXI of Part III were
by Dewey. The entire book was revised for the second edition of 1932. According to
the "Preface to the 1932 Edition" (p. iii), "about two thirds of the present edition
has been newly written, and frequent changes in detail will be found in the remainder." The part of the Ethics from which we have drawn the basis for Dewey's
notion of justice as a virtue is Part II. According to the same preface, "Part II has
been recast; the method of presentation has been changed and the material practically
all rewritten." (p. iv). Because Part II stands as a separate unit in relation to what
precedes and to what follows, in 1960 Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc., of New
York brought it out in paperback with the title of Theory of the Moral Life (with
an introduction by Arnold Isenberg). It is to this edition that our footnotes correspond.
The 1932 revision of Part II of the Ethics remains Dewey's last extensive and broad
treatment of the theory of moral life. One significant essay (Theory of Valuation)
was to be written by him later (1939) as part of the University of Chicago Press's
InternationalEncyclopedia of Unified Science, Vol. II, No. 4, 67 pp. It is mainly an
effort to show that scientific method can be applied to value judgments; and its
enormous fame has greatly obscured the more general and theoretical treatment of
morality presented in the Ethics. However, it was in this earlier treatment that
Dewey's discussion of justice as an ethical notion first emerged and which links him to
the more traditionally oriented moral theories.
3. Isenberg, Introduction to DmvEY, THEORY OF =smMORAL LIFE viii (1960).

4. Id. at ix.
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judges for himself, considers whether a purpose is good or right,
decides and chooses, and does not accept the standards of his group
without reflection;" and secondarily with customary behavior which
entails relatively little critical reflection and with actions motivated
by non-moral needs which nonetheless have important results for
morals.5
Since no fundamental difference exists between systematic moral
theory and the reflection an individual engages in when he attempts
to find general principles which shall direct and justify his conduct,
we may say that moral theory in regard to justice begins when any
one asks: "Why should I act thus and not otherwise? Why is this
just rather than unjust; what right has anyone to frown upon this way
of acting and impose that other way?" Such reflective consideration
begins with the data of existing situations and only if the individual
is confronted with conflicting goods and his old modes of activity no
longer suffice. It is the extension of such reflection that leads to moral
theory.
Some have tended to minimize the importance of reflection in moral
issues.
They hold that men already know more morally than they practice and that

there is general agreement among men on all moral fundamentals.... But
in fact the agreement exists to a large extent only with reference to concepts

that are taken vaguely and apart from practical application. Justice: to be
sure; give to each that which is his due. But is individualistic competitive
capitalism a just system? or socialism? or communism? Is inheritance of
large fortunes, without rendering of personal service to society, just? What
system of taxation is just? What are the moral claims of free-trade and

protection? What would constitute a just system of the distribution of
national income?6

No doubt few would question the desirability of justice, but there is
a multitude of interpretations as to its meaning. Universal agreement
upon an abstract principle, even where it does exist, can be only the
preliminary step to cooperative investigation and thoughtful planning,
for systematic and consistent reflection.
Every moral theory which tries to determine the end of conduct
has a twofold task. It is "to frame a theory of Good as the end or
objective of desire;"' and also to frame a theory of the true, as distinct
from the seeming, good. In effect this latter, called moral wisdom,
implies "the discovery of ends which will meet the demands of impartial and farsighted thought as well as satisfy the urgencies of
desire."8
5. Id. at x.
6. DmvEY, THEoRY
7. Id. at 37.

8. Ibid.

OF THE MoRAL LrE 21

(1960).
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In connection with the reflective theory of the Good there enter
into morality certain factors which seem to be independent of any
form of satisfaction and hence independent of the Good. These
factors are responsibility and obligation, and traditionally are centered around the conception of the Right. A distinction arises between
what we want to do, even upon reflection, and what we ought to do.
When what is "right" signifies the road or path which leads to the
greater good, the social good as embodied by law, there is introduced
the element of exaction or demand. This involves the idea of an
authoritative claim which imposes a demand to follow the best and
direct road to the good. A person must see the more comprehensive
good, or social good, as that more reasonable to choose. In this case,
"the Good is that which attracts; the Right is that which asserts that
we ought to be drawn by some object whether we are naturally
attracted to it or not."9
The social demands to which we are subject give rise to duty.
Such an "exercise of claims is as natural as anything else in a world
in which persons are not isolated from one another but live in constant association and interaction." 10 Particular rights and duties may
be arbitrary, but they need not be; for "there is nothing arbitrary or
forced in the existence of right and obligation."" Right, law and
duty arise "because of the inherent relationships persons sustain to
one another," and the consequent expectations of others, whose
authoritative force springs "from the very nature of the relations that
bind people together," imposing themselves as duty even when they
run counter to the good called for by a present desire.
Duties at first arise from specific situations, but with maturity we
formulate a general idea of duty distinct from any particular situation. It is more than a mere generalized extract, for it constitutes a
new attitude toward future special situations. As such it is a principle
of action, an instrument, an ideal.
An ideal of duty, if it is to be reflective, leads to the formulation
of a standard or criterion of conduct. Thereby praise and blame are
assigned to social conduct. Dewey sees this standard of admiration
and esteem as the contribution to the universal happiness or welfare
of society-as long as such a standard would recognize the great part
played by factors internal to the self in creating a worthy happiness.
By means of such a standard we find that "institutions are good not
only because of their direct contribution to well-being but even more
because they favor the development of the worthy dispositions from
which issue noble enjoyments." That is, social arrangements are of
9. Id. at 67.
10. Id. at 68.
11. Id. at 81.
12. I& at 100-01.
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moral value if they tend to lead members of the community to find
their happiness in the objects and purposes which bring happiness to
others.
This is not an equation of personal and general happiness except
in so far as an individual achieves a kind of happiness which is
harmonious with the happiness of others by personal choice of those
ends of desire which are in agreement with the needs of social relations. The distinction between personal and general happiness is
seen also in the difference between end and standard. The end is
the particular good which is the object of desire, and whose attainment
leads to satisfaction of desire or happiness. The standard is the
criterion by which we examine past actions, or purposed future
actions as if they were past, in order to determine their goodness from
another point of view: would the action which achieves it further the
well-being of all concerned or affected by the act?
Right, with its notions of duty and standard, if separated completely from the Good, or satisfaction of desire, will lead to a sense of
duty and justice that is merely abstract, without concrete application.
To Dewey it is impossible to go from the idea of duty in general to
that of some particular act or mode of conduct as dutiful unless we
connect Right and Good. The "connection" of which he writes is that
between means and end, between the best way of doing something
(Right) and the object that is to be attained (Good). And this is
accomplished by giving consideration to possible consequences and
how they affect others.
It is in such a context of standard as shared good that Dewey
presents his first extensive treatment of justice. He begins with an
observation: it seems, to some, that when contribution to a shared
good is taken to be the standard of approbation, benevolence is
exalted to such a point that justice almost falls out of the moral
picture. In other words, charity seems to be so complete that there
is no need to appeal to justice. Such a standard of general well-being
has been attacked, according to Dewey, by those who say that
justice is the supreme virtue and must not be subordinated to something beyond itself, even to consequences that attend to the wellbeing of society. Those who so exalt justice above all virtues and
regard consideration of consequences as a degradation of this virtue
take their stand, Dewey tells us, on an abstract principle of justice.
To them justice must be done, come what may. And to them even
such consequences as the common and shared good "reduces justice
to a matter of expediency and abates its authority and majesty." 3
Dewey's reply to this objection is twofold. First of all, to eliminate
a consideration of the consequences of action from any moral stand13. Id. at 105.
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ard is to be left with only a formal principle. Morality is thus considered as mere conformity to an abstraction instead of the vital effort
in behalf of a significant end that it is.
[Moreover], experience shows that the subordination of human good to an
external and formal rule tends in the direction of harshness and cruelty. The
common saying that justice should be tempered with mercy is a popular
way of stating recognition of the hard and ultimately unjust character of
setting up a principle of action which is divorced from all consideration of
human consequences. 14

Any conception of justice as an end-in-itself is a case of making an
idol out of a means at the expense of the end which the means serves.
This leads to the second aspect of Dewey's objection. To him,
"justice is not an external means to human welfare but a means which
is organically integrated with the end it serves." 5 Justice is a means
which is a constituent part of the consequences or the just acts it
brings into being. To illustrate this intimate connection between
means and end Dewey uses the example of tones that are integral
constituents of music as well as means to its production, and of food
that is an indispensable ingredient within the organism it serves.
Aside from this twofold objection, Dewey finds what he calls "an
inherent difficulty" in any conception that separates justice from the
effects of actions upon human well-being. This difficulty is that "the
separation leaves the practical meaning of standard arbitrary or open
to different constructions."' 6 As he puts it, "there is no necessary
connection between a conviction of right and good in general and
what is right and good in particular."1 He cites two instances to
illustrate the various intepretations of justice that have been offered.
Some have maintained that justice signifies strict retribution, an eye
for an eye, a tooth for a tooth. Others, of whom Herbert Spencer is
an example, identify the principle of justice with the relation of cause
and effect in its biological meaning of natural selection by the elimination of the unfit in the struggle for existence. "It is 'just' he (Spencer)
asserts that the inferior should stand the consequences of their inferiority and that the superior should reap the rewards of their
superiority. To interfere with the workings of natural selection is
thus to violate the law of justice." 18
Those who exalt justice in isolation from just acts seem to indicate
that the notion of justice carries its own meaning. "The truth lies on
the other side. The meaning of justice in concrete cases is something
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

ibid.
Ibid.
Id. at 106.
Id. at 127.
Ibid.
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to be determined by seeing what consequences will bring about
human welfare in a fair and even way."19 Even the broad and legalistic conception of justice as "rendering to another that which is his"
raises more questions than solves problems. We are prompted to ask:
what does belong to a man as man?20 How is what is morally due to
a man to be measured? In terms of the classic emphasis on external
matters such as property, reputation, honor, etc.? In terms of what
is fixed by convention and custom? "Or is what is owed to a person,'
Dewey asks, "anything less than an opportunity to become all that he
is capable of becoming"? It is not difficult to see that for Dewey
justice will be the concern for the objective conditions of personal
growth and achievement which, in his words, "cannot be distinguished from beneficence in its fundamental and objective sense." 2' 1
Thus Dewey declines to draw an arbitrary distinction between
justice and beneficence or charity. In his opinion, those who set up
the "opposition" between them rest their case upon a narrow conception of justice and upon a sentimental notion of beneficence. According to Dewey, "if beneficence is taken to signify acts which exceed
the necessities of legal obligation, and justice to denote adherence
to the strict letter of moral law, there is, of course, a wide gap between them."22 In reality the scope of justice is broad enough to
cover all conditions which make for social relations, including those
called "welfare." For, "a large part of what passes as charity and
philanthropy is merely a makeshift to compensate for lack of just
social conditions."23

The erroneous notion that beneficence is a sentimental phenomenon
19. Id. at 107.
20. It is at this point that Dewey's notion of justice, as do all notions of this virtue,
has its roots. Upon the conception of what man is is built every ethical theory. The
deeper and irreconcilable differences between the various ethical systems-especially
between those that are supernaturalistically orientated and those that are naturalistically
geared-are to be found at this level. It will be noticed that Dewey often speaks of
human "nature"' in regard to man and to the relations (later to be formulated into
laws) that emerge from man living in society. The "nature of man must not be
interpreted, so Dewey tells us, in the traditional, pre-evolutionistic sense of the termas an authentic, immutable, given something that underlies the changing appearance of
man.
Nor must the laws that grow out of natural relations be thought of as natural law,
unless, as Dewey points out, we mean by "natural law" the need of the adoption of
technical and official legal rules by the use of reason to secure desirable results in
practice in regard to justice. Nature and Reason in Law, reprinted in PF ,OsopH AND
CIVIZ=ATION 172 (1931). What is unacceptable to Dewey is any use of "natural law"
in which "natural" is identified with "rational" or that which is thought to be correct
or unchanging, or is identified with the given state of affairs. In such cases an appeal
to nature would signify "the reverse of an appeal to what is desirable in the way of
consequences." Id. at 167. It then can be a weapon for prolonging unjust and uneven
conditions by those who stand to gain most by such injustice.
21. D - ,op. cit. supra note 6, at 109.
22. Id. at 108.
23. Ibid.
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does not exclude sympathetic concern from a reflective moral theory.
The emotion of sympathy, it is the opinion of Dewey, can be morally
invaluable when used with reflection. "To put ourselves in the place
of another, to see things from the standpoint of his aims and values,
to humble our estimate of our own pretensions to the level they
assume in the eyes of an impartial observer, is the surest way to
appreciate what justice demands in concrete cases." 24 Sympathetic
concern for consequences, guided by intelligence, is saved from
becoming sentimental .meddling in the affairs of others. Rather, the
person who intelligently utilizes his sympathetic concerns endeavors
to reform social conditions so that
all individuals can exercise their own initiative in a social medium which

will develop their personal capacities and reward their efforts. That is, it
[he] is concerned with providing the objective political, economic, and

social conditions which will enable the greatest possible number because of
their own endeavors to have a full and generous share in the values of
living.25

This is social justice-chiefly concerned with indirect help by inaugurating objective social conditions of equity, while also concerned with
direct help of those who cannot participate in normal activities because of illness, physical incapacity, pecuniary distress, etc.
The basic identity of justice and beneficence in Dewey's position
cannot be understood without examining his notion of virtue and
character. Moreover, it is in the context of virtue that his notion of
justice takes on its fullest meaning. The concept of virtue is closely
connected with standard of approval, as Dewey sees it. Whereas in
primitive morals those traits of character which are approved are
virtuous, in reflective morality the attitude is reversed. A theory of
morals subject to reflective examination attempts to discover "What
traits of character should be approved; it identifies virtue not with
that which is de facto approved but that which is approvabte, which
should be approved."26
Because customary or unreflective morality rests upon an uncritical
acceptance of existing institutions and modes of activity, it is possible
to draw up a list or catalogue of those virtues which lead to conformity and their corresponding vices. At the onset of his discussion
Dewey makes it clear that in reflective morality, precisely because it
is reflective, any such list has no more than a tentative status. Because of this, no particular virtue, justice for example, can be given
a "fixed meaning" since it expresses an interest in objects and institu24. Id. at 107.
25. Id. at 108.
26. Id. at 109.
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tions which are changing or ought to be changed.
This, however, does not mean that there is nothing permanent about
virtue.
In form, as interests, they [virtues] may be permanent since no community
could endure in which there were not, say, fair dealing, public spirit, regard
for help, faithfulness to others. But no two communities conceive the
objects to which these qualities attach themselves in quite identical ways.27

Therefore, the only basis upon which virtue can be defined is in
reference to the "qualities characteristic of interest" and not on the
basis of permanent and uniform objects in which interest is taken.
Accordingly, Dewey discusses virtue by an enumeration of the traits
which must belong to an attitude called "virtuous" and not by listing
actual virtues "as if they were separate entities." To him there are
three main characteristics of virtue: (1) wholeheartedness, (2)
persistence, and (3) impartiality. First of all, "an interest must be
wholehearted."2 By this is meant that he who is virtuous has integrity, sincerity, devotion which is unmixed and undiluted. He who is
virtuous is "single-minded" in so far as he has brought into order and
unity his various interests and their objects by reflecting on them.
This is not to be identified with merely a succession of intense
emotional feelings of enthusiasm, for it involves devotion to a line
of action that may not be to his immediate personal interest but that
does serve the public interest.
Such devotion naturally leads to the second trait of virtue. "Hence
the interest which constitutes a disposition virtuous must be con2 9 Such persistence excludes the lack of stabiltinuous and persistent."
ity characteristic of "fair-weather virtue" and involves "sticking it
out" even when conditions are adverse-once the interest has been
reflectively approved.
The last main trait of virtue is "impartiality," for a complete and
wholehearted interest must be impartial as well as enduring. Individuals tend to be interested in the well-being of family and friends and
to be indifferent to others. This easily leads to one scale for determining interests of one's own community, nationality, color, religion, etc.,
and a different scale for those of other groups. The result is partiality
or lack of complete universality of interest. As Dewey puts it:
Complete universality of interest is impossible in the sense of equality of
strength or force of quantity; that is, it would be mere pretense to suppose

that one can be as much interested in those at a distance with whom one
has little [or no] contact as in those with whom one is in constant communi27. Id. at 113.
28. Ibid.
29. Id. at 114.
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cation. But equity, or impartiality of interest is a matter of quality not of

quantity as in-iquity is a matter not of more or less, but of using uneven
measures of judgment.3 0

The impartiality of virtue insists that in estimating consequences
in the way of weal and woe "for all sentient creatures who are affected
by an act.., each one shall count as one, irrespective of distinctions
of birth, sex, race, social status, economic and political position."31
Such an impartial attitude demands, on the part of one who acts in
relation to others, that he should have "an equal and even measure of
value" as far as the interests of others who are affected by his action.
According to Dewey, it must be remembered that "in an immediate
or emotional sense" it is not possible to love our enemies as we love
our friends.32 But the maxim to love our enemies as we love ourselves
signifies that in our conduct we should take into account their interests at the same rate of estimate as we employ for our own interests and those of our friends. Thus, any act is virtuous when it
has impartiality as the principle for regulating the consequences of
that act in so far as it bears upon the happiness of others.
It is this characteristic of impartiality that seems to save Dewey's
enumeration of the traits of virtue from applying equally as well to
vice. The acts of most notorious individuals can be said to be characterized by "wholeheartedness" and "persistence." Indeed, viewed
merely from these traits, most prison inmates are far more "virtuous"
than most law-abiding citizens Dewey, however, recognizes this, for
to him single mindedness of purpose and persistence of disposition is
narrow if it is not united to breadth and impartiality of interest.3
Such a view of virtue saves us, in Dewey's opinion, from two
unfortunate results. First, there is no danger of the identification of
virtue "with whatever is conventionally and currently prized in a
particular community or social set."3 Moreover, it protects against
the "unreal separation of virtuous qualities from one another" and the
consequent temptation to catalogue virtues so as to pigeon-hole them
in water-tight compartments.
The fact is that "virtuous traits interpenetrate one another."3 It is
this unity that is implied in the very idea of "integrity of character."
Virtues are named according to the emphasis demanded of activity
under the actual circumstances. For example:
At one time persistence and endurance in the face of obstacles is the
prominent feature; then the attitude is the excellence called courage. At
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Ibid.
Id. at 94.
Id. at 115.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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another time, the trait of impartiality and equity is uppermost, and we call

it justice. At other times, the necessity for subordinating immediate satisfaction of a strong appetite or desire to a comprehensive good is the
conspicious feature. Then the disposition is denominated temperance, self
control. When the prominent phase is the need for thoughtfulness, for
consecutive and persistent attention, in order that these other qualities may
function, the interest receives the name of moral wisdom, insight, conscientiousness. 36

To repeat: "in each case the difference is one of emphasis only."
Such an integration is far from having mere theoretical import.
There are immense practical repercussions. One such is the freeing
of morality from the accusation that it is merely negative and restrictive. "When, for example, an independent thing is made of
temperance or self control it becomes mere inhibition, a sour constraint. But as one phase of an interpenetrated whole, it is the
positive harmony characteristic of integrated interest."3 7 Justice
separated from other virtues tends to take on "a mechanical and
quantitative form, like the exact meeting out of praise and blame,
reward and punishment. Or it is thought of as vindication of abstract
and impersonal law-an attitude which always tends to make men
vindictive and leads them to justify their harshness as a virtue."3 8
Another bad effect of treating virtues as if they were isolated from
one another is the attempt to cultivate each by itself "instead of
developing a rounded and positive character."39 In traditional morality there are many reminders of this, as when love is said to be "the
fulfilling of the law" and includes the cultivation of all the virtues.
The traditional notion of wisdom is one of thoughtfulness or sympathetic consideration of the consequences of action. Thoughtfulness
is thinking and "to think is to look at a thing in its relationswith other
things, and such judgment often modifies radically the original attitude of esteem and liking."40 In a word, it is reflective or critical.
Such action includes as part of itself the impartial concern for all
conditions which affect the common welfare, be they specific acts,
laws, economic arrangements, political institutions, or whatever. "And
such a complete interest is the only way in which justice can be
assured."

41

Dewey is in agreement with the tradition that says "only the just
man is a just judge of what is truly just." This is because justice is
not something which a man has, as he may have money in his wallet.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

ibid.
Id. at 116.
Ibid.
Id. at 117.
Id. at 123.
Id. at 117.
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It is something he is; and since his being is active, the quality of
justice, as are all other qualities, is a mode of activity which produces,
but does not force, activity. This notion of morality involves a recognition "of the essential unity of the self and its acts" whereby actions
reveal the existing self and form the future self.42
Justice as the source of just activity is the principle or instrument
which aids the individual in the examination of particular situations.
As such, justice must not be mistaken for rules that are just. Rules are
fixed prescriptions of action for identical situations. When separated
from their experiential origin as outgrowths of just situations, they
have an unfortunate tendency to be considered superior to actual
cases. Even worse has been the consideration of justice as a fixed and
absolute rule, for this has made it vague and left its application to
chance or authoritative dictation. Moreover, a conception of justice
as a fixed rule tends "to render men satisfied with the existing state
of affairs and to take the ideas and judgments they already possess
as adequate and final."43 To the degree to which this happens, the
attitude of seeking for new rules of justice applicable in changed
situations is diminished or destroyed. And, justice is this attitudel
"Taken as a principle, not as a rule, justice signifies the will to
examine specific institutions and measures so as to find out how they
operate with the view of introducing greater impartiality and equity
into consequences they produce." 44
Because each new generation is confronted with situations which
are to varying degrees different, special rules of justice cannot be
considered absolutely fixed. At most, such rules are fixed only for
identical situations and tentative for new circumstances. Each new
generation is under the obligation to examine reflectively its inherited
stock of moral principles and to reconsider them in relation to contemporary conditions and needs. But, in the words of Dewey,
it is stupid to suppose that this signifies that all moral principles are so
relative to a particular state of society that they have no binding force in

any (other) social condition. The obligation is to discover what principles
are relevant to our own social estate. . . . There are common human affections and impulses which express themselves within every social environment;-there is no people the members of which do not have a belief in the

value of human life, of care of offspring, of loyalty to tribal and community
customs, etc., however restricted and one-sided they may be in the applica45
tion of these beliefs.

That extreme revolt which says that all morals are conventional and
of no validity goes too far, Dewey asserts, even though it is the
42.
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expected result of the insistence on a uniform and unchanging code
of morals, the same for all times and places. The only way to avoid
either extreme is to recognize the "close and vital relationship" that
exists between morals and social forces; and to search for principles,
especially the principle of justice, which are truly relevant in our own
day.
According as social conditions and the level of culture vary, moral
phenomena will change. This is not to say that all moral facts are
relative. Desire, purpose, social demand and law, sympathetic approval and hostile disapproval cannot be imagined as disappearing, in
the words of Dewey, "as long as human nature remains human, and
lives in association with others."4 Moreover,
the fundamental conceptions of morals are neither arbitrary nor artificial.
They are not imposed upon human nature from without but develop out of
its own operations and needs. Particular aspects of morals are transient;
they are often, in their actual manifestation, defective and perverted. But
47
the framework of moral conceptions is as permanent as human life itself.

A reflective theory of morality calls for the cultivation of a virtuous
character not only in regard to justice, but in respect to all virtues.
However, no character is formed in isolation of social evironments.
Because of this, such a morality is in danger of becoming purely
nominal and remaining theoretical unless it can reconstructthe social
environment. Dewey recognizes that
through religion and from other sources, love of neighbor, exact equity,
kindliness of action and judgment, are taught and in theory accepted. The
structure of society, however, puts emphasis upon other qualities. "Business"
absorbs a large part of the life of most persons and business is conducted
upon the basis of ruthless competition for private gain. National life is
organized on the basis of exclusiveness and tends to generate suspicion, fear,
often hatred, of other peoples. The world is divided into classes and races,
and, in spite of acceptance of an opposed theory [based on 'love thy
neighbor"], the standards of valuation are based on the class, race, color,
with which one identifies oneself. The convictions that obtain in personal
morality are negated on a large scale in collective conduct, and for this
reason are weakened even in their strictly personal application. They cannot be made good in practice except as they are extended to include the
remaking of the social environment, economic, political, international. 48
46. Id. at 176.
47. Ibid.
48. Id. at 117-18.

